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Donald Marron
Donald Marron is the director of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center. He previously served as a member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, as acting director of the Congressional Budget Office, and as executive director of Congress’s Joint Economic Committee. Before his government service, he taught economics and finance at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business and served as chief financial officer of a health care software start-up. Donald is also a visiting professor at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute.
Capital Gains Taxes Are Going Up
January 24th, 2012The top tax rate on long-term capital gains is currently 15%. That’s why Mitt Romney is spending so much time talking about his tax returns.
That revelation has set off a familiar debate about whether that low rate is appropriate. Often overlooked in these discussions, however, is the fact that the days of the 15% tax rate are numbered. As of this posting, it has only 342 left.
On January 1, 2013, capital gains taxes are scheduled to go up sharply:
First, the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are scheduled to expire. If that happens, the regular top rate on capital gains will rise to 20%. In addition, an obscure provision of the tax code, the limitation on itemized deductions, will return in full force. That provision, known as Pease, increases effective tax rates on high-income taxpayers by reducing the value of their itemized deductions. On net, it will add another 1.2 percentage points to the effective capital gains tax rate for high-income taxpayers.
And that’s not all. The health reform legislation enacted in 2010 imposed a new tax on the net investment income of high-income taxpayers, including capital gains. That adds another 3.8 percentage points to the tax rate.
Put it all together, and the top tax rate on capital gains is scheduled to increase from 15% today to 25% on January 1. That’s a big jump. If taxpayers really believe this will happen, expect a torrent of asset selling in November and December as wealthy taxpayers take final advantage of the lower rate.
Of course, the tax cuts might get extended for all Americans, including high-income taxpayers. That’s what happened in 2010. In that case, the increase in the capital gains rate will be smaller. Because of the health reform tax, the top capital gains tax rate will increase from 15% to 18.8%. That’s still a notable increase, but would likely set off much less tax-oriented selling this year.
The only way that the top capital gains tax rate remains at 15% will be if the tax cuts are extended for high-income taxpayers and the new health reform tax gets repealed. That’s a key distinction in the election: President Barack Obama opposes those steps, while the GOP presidential candidates favor them (and some candidates would cut the capital gains tax rate even further).
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December 15th, 20112011 was another active year for America’s tax and fiscal policy; thank you for sharing it with TaxVox.
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Flat-tax Simplicity with a Progressive Twist
November 28th, 2011My latest column for the Christian Science Monitor:
Tax reform has emerged as a key issue for GOP presidential hopefuls. Texas Gov. Rick Perry wants to scrap our current system and replace it with a 20 percent flat tax on individual and corporate incomes. Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich wants to do the same, but with even lower rates.
Then there’s pizza magnate Herman Cain. His “9-9-9″ plan would replace today’s income and payroll taxes with a trio of levies: a 9 percent flat tax on individuals, another on businesses, and a 9 percent retail sales tax. But Mr. Cain’s ultimate vision is to eliminate anything remotely resembling today’s tax system in favor of a national retail sales tax, which proponents call the FairTax.
These three plans have much in common. Catchy names, for one. More important, they all focus on taxing consumption – what people spend – rather than income.
Equally important, however, is the way the flat tax handles investment income. Individuals would pay taxes on their labor income but not on capital gains, dividends, or interest.
That doesn’t mean capital income would escape taxation. Instead, the taxes would be collected at the business level. Businesses would pay taxes on all their income, regardless of whether it’s paid out as dividends or interest. They would also be allowed to write off the entire cost of new investments when they are made.
The net result of these rules is that people would be taxed only to the extent that they consume. In the words of Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka, the economists who invented the flat tax 30 years ago, “people are taxed on what they take out of the economy, not on what they put in.”
The flat tax is thus a very close cousin to the FairTax and other retail sales taxes (which many Republicans like) and to value-added taxes (which they don’t). The logistics differ: A sales tax is collected on retail purchases, a VAT from businesses at each stage of the supply chain, and a flat tax from individuals and businesses. But the underlying economics work out the same: People get taxed only on their consumption.
There are good reasons to favor a simpler tax system that emphasizes taxes on consumption over income. Some policy experts across the political spectrum embrace exactly that approach to tax reform. But all these plans would be much less progressive than our current income tax, and that’s neither appropriate nor politically viable.
What we need are tax-reform proposals that would maintain progressivity while harvesting many of the benefits of simplicity and consumption taxation. The late Princeton economist David Bradford offered one simple approach: Add progressive rates to a flat tax. Columbia Law School Prof. Michael Graetz offered another: Pair a broad-based VAT with an income tax for folks with high incomes. These ideas might not have much traction among GOP primary voters. But they offer a much better starting point for reform than the plans on the table today.
Taxes and Energy Policy
September 29th, 2011Last week I had the opportunity to testify before two Ways and Means subcommittees–Select Revenue Measures and Oversight–about the way our tax system is used as a tool of energy policy. Here are my opening remarks. You can find my full testimony here.
As you know, our tax system is desperately in need of reform. It’s needlessly complex, economically harmful, and often unfair. Because of a plethora of temporary tax cuts, it’s also increasingly unpredictable.
We can and should do better.
The most promising path to reform is to reexamine the many tax preferences in our code. For decades, lawmakers have used the tax system not only to raise revenues to pay for government activities, but also to pursue a broad range of social and economic policies. These policies touch many aspects of life, including health insurance, home ownership, retirement saving, and the topic of today’s hearing, energy production and use.
These preferences often support important policy goals, but they have a downside. They narrow the tax base, reduce revenues, distort economic activity, complicate the tax system, force tax rates to be higher than they otherwise would be, and are often unfair. Those concerns have prompted policymakers and analysts across the political spectrum—including, most notably, the Bowles-Simpson commission—to recommend that tax preferences be cut back. The resulting revenue could then be used to lower tax rates, reduce future deficits, or some combination of the two.
In considering such proposals, lawmakers should consider how tax reform, fiscal concerns, and energy policy interact. Six factors are particularly important.
- Our tax system needs a fundamental overhaul. Every tax provision, including those related to energy, deserves close scrutiny to determine whether its benefits exceed its costs. Such a review will reveal that many tax preferences should be reduced, redesigned, or eliminated.
- The code includes numerous energy tax preferences. The Treasury Department, for example, recently identified 25 types of energy preferences worth about $16 billion in 2011. These include incentives for renewable energy sources, traditional fossil fuel sources, and energy efficiency. In addition, energy companies are also eligible for several tax preferences that are available more broadly, such as the domestic production credit.
- Tax subsidies are an imperfect way of pursuing energy and environmental policy goals. Such subsidies do encourage greater use of targeted energy resources. But, as I discuss in greater detail in my written testimony, they do so in an economically wasteful manner. Subsidies require, for example, that the government play a substantial role in picking winners and losers among energy technologies. The associated revenue losses also require higher taxes or larger deficits.
- A key political challenge for reform is that energy tax subsidies are often viewed as tax cuts. It makes more sense, however, to view them as spending through the tax code. Reducing such subsidies would make the government smaller even though tax revenues, as conventionally measured, would increase.
- Tax subsidies are not created equal. Production incentives reward businesses for producing desired energy and are agnostic about what mix of capital, labor, and materials firms use to accomplish that. Investment incentives, in contrast, reward businesses merely for making qualifying investments and encourage firms to use relatively more capital than labor. For both reasons, production incentives tend to be more efficient than investment incentives.
- Well-designed taxes can typically address the negative effects of energy use more effectively and at lower cost than can tax subsidies. I understand that higher gasoline taxes or a new carbon tax are not popular ideas in many circles, but please bear with me. As I explain at length in my written testimony, well-designed energy taxes are a much more pro-market way of addressing energy concerns than are tax subsidies. Taxes take full advantage of market forces and, in so doing, can accomplish policy goals at least cost and with minimal government intervention. Subsidies, in contrast, make much less use of market forces and inevitably require the government to pick winners and losers. Energy taxes also generate revenue that lawmakers can use to cut other taxes or to reduce deficits.
P.S. Not surprisingly, that last point wasn’t picked up by anyone else, at least during my panel (one of three at the hearing). New energy taxes would, of course, be problematic for the macroeconomy if enacted immediately. And we’d have to make some adjustment, either in the tax code or in benefit programs, to offset the impact on low-income families. In the long-run, however, I think that would be a much better way to address many energy concerns, including carbon emissions and oil dependence. But that’s not the way our system works. Instead, as noted, it’s much more popular to use tax preferences, whose benefits are visible and whose costs are obscure, to pursue energy and environmental goals. Other participants discussed the particular incentives, existing and proposed, in greater detail; their testimony is available here.
Deadlines, Deadlines, Deadlines
September 26th, 2011My latest column for the Christian Science Monitor argues that a slew of budget deadlines will drive policy action this Fall. Case in point, the potential for a government shutdown when the government’s fiscal year ends later this week. I don’t think that’s likely, at least not yet, but such deadlines will be the big thing this fall:
September brings the change of seasons. Football players return to the gridiron. New television programs replace summer reruns. In Washington, legislators gear up for another season of legislative brinkmanship.
What distinguishes such brinkmanship from ordinary legislating? Hard deadlines.
Such deadlines force Congress to address policy issues that might otherwise languish due to partisan differences or legislative inertia.
Last spring, for example, the repeated threat of a government shutdown forced Congress to decide how much to spend on government agencies in fiscal 2011. This summer, the debt limit forced Republicans and Democrats to reach a budget compromise before Aug. 3, the day we would have discovered what happens if America can’t pay all its bills.
Hard deadlines thus can force Congress to address major issues. But they also invite that brinkmanship.
Like students who put off writing term papers until the night before they’re due, legislators often drag out negotiations until the very end. As we saw with the debt-limit debate, the ensuing uncertainty – will the United States really default? – can damage consumer, business, and international confidence. Hard deadlines also give leverage to those legislators who are least concerned about going over the brink.
So get ready for the new season. The fall legislative season is full of deadlines that could invite such brinkmanship. Here are five.
[The first two were funding for the Federal Aviation Administration, whose short-term funding was scheduled to expire on September 16 and the highway bill, whose funding was scheduled to expire on September 30. Both won temporary extensions between the time I wrote my column and when it appeared online. FAA funding now runs to January, and highway funding through March.] …
Sept. 30 also marks the end of the fiscal year – an especially important deadline. Congress has made woefully little progress in deciding next year’s funding. So we again face the prospect of temporary funding bills being negotiated in the shadow of threatened government shutdowns.
The fourth deadline comes on Nov. 23, the day the new “super committee” has to deliver a plan to address government debt and cut the deficit by at least $1.2 trillion over the next decade. If any seven committee members agree by that date, their plan will get special, expedited consideration in the House and Senate.
If the committee fails to reach agreement or Congress fails to enact it by Dec. 23, however, then automatic budget cuts go into effect for a range of programs, including defense, domestic programs, and Medicare, starting in 2013.
A final deadline comes at the end of the year, when several economic initiatives are set to expire, including the 2 percent payroll tax holiday and extended unemployment insurance benefits.
Each of these deadlines will command congressional attention. The downside of inaction will be tangible and visible. With renewed concern about jobs, policymakers will feel extra pressure to continue any funding or tax cuts that can be directly linked to employment.
These deadline-driven policy issues will thus dominate the fall legislative season. That will leave little space for any new initiatives that don’t come with a deadline.
Retracting Some Recent Estimates
September 23rd, 2011On September 21, TPC published several tables (T11-0359 through 0362) that examine how effective tax rates vary within income groups. Those tables were intended to shed light on recent claims that some high-income taxpayers face low tax rates.
Unfortunately, we made an error in our calculations. That error, which involved rollover distributions from 401(k)s and similar retirement plans, caused us to significantly overstate the income of some high-income taxpayers and thus understate the tax rates they paid. We have therefore retracted the tables while we work to fix our estimates.
We regret this error and apologize to our many users for any inconvenience. TPC is committed to providing the highest-quality information about America’s tax system. We fell short this time. But we have sharpened our pencils and look forward to releasing new estimates.
More Budget Foxes, Fewer Hedgehogs
August 19th, 2011My latest column at the Christian Science Monitor:
America’s fiscal challenges are often portrayed as a conflict between hawks and doves. The real battle, however, is between foxes and hedgehogs.
“The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing,” wrote the ancient Greek poet Archilochus. Both foxes and hedgehogs play important roles in the policy ecosystem in normal times. In times of great change, however, society needs more foxes and fewer hedgehogs. More citizens and leaders who can adapt to new conditions, and fewer who want to preserve the status quo.
That’s where we find ourselves today. Despite all the anguish over a debt limit deal, America’s fiscal outlook remains daunting. Little progress has been made on our largest budget challenges. Despite bipartisan efforts, prospects for a grand fiscal bargain remain dim.
One reason is that fiscal hedgehogs still have the upper paw on key issues.
Consider entitlements. Everyone knows that entitlement spending is our No. 1 long-term budget challenge. Because of an aging population and rising health-care costs, spending on Social Security and federal health programs will explode. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that over the next 25 years spending on these programs will rise from roughly 10 percent of the economy to almost 17 percent. Accommodating that growth would require substantial cuts in other government programs, much higher tax revenues, or unsustainable deficits and debt.
The challenge is to find ways to keep the core benefits of these programs while reining in costs. This is where entitlement hedgehogs and foxes part company.
The hedgehogs know one big thing: These programs provide major benefits. Social Security, for example, has dramatically reduced poverty among seniors and provides essential income to millions of retirees.
Inspired by that one big thing, hedgehogs oppose any benefit reductions, such as increasing the eligibility age or trimming benefits to reflect increased longevity.
Entitlement foxes have a more nuanced view. They recognize, like the hedgehogs, the value of the guaranteed retirement income that Social Security provides. But they also know that the number of retirees receiving benefits is growing faster than the number of workers paying payroll taxes. They know that Americans are living longer but retiring earlier. They know, in short, that the future will be different from the past and that the program needs to evolve to remain sustainable. Foxes are thus open to ideas like raising the eligibility age or changing the benefit formula.
A similar dichotomy exists with taxes. Revenue hedgehogs know one big thing: Taxes place a burden on taxpayers and the economy. Thus, they oppose all tax increases, even efforts to reduce the many tax breaks that complicate our tax code.
Revenue foxes see things differently. They recognize the burden that taxes place on taxpayers and the economy. But they also know that tax increases are not all created equal. Higher tax rates, for example, are usually worse for the economy than cutting back on tax breaks. Indeed, cutting tax breaks sometimes frees taxpayers to make decisions based on real economic considerations rather than taxes, thus strengthening the economy. That’s why revenue foxes support eliminating many tax breaks.
Fiscal hedgehogs will never embrace such changes. To make progress, we need more fiscal foxes.
S&P’s $2 Trillion Error
August 7th, 2011In the final hours before Friday’s historic downgrade, Standard & Poors gave Treasury an advance copy of its report. Amazingly, that report contained a $2 trillion error in its calculations of U.S. deficits and debt over the next decade. Here are four things you should know about it.
1. Treasury hoped that S&P would change its decision in light of the error, but S&P shrugged it off as not material.
In a blog post, Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy John Bellows described what happened when the error was discovered:
After Treasury pointed out this error – a basic math error of significant consequence – S&P still chose to proceed with their flawed judgment by simply changing their principal rationale for their credit rating decision from an economic one to a political one.
The primary focus [of our analysis] remained on the current level of debt, the trajectory of debt as a share of the economy, and the lack of apparent willingness of elected officials as a group to deal with the U.S. medium term fiscal outlook. None of these key factors was meaningfully affected by the assumption revisions to the assumed growth of discretionary outlays and thus had no impact on the rating decision.
2. Despite S&P’s claim, $2 trillion would “meaningfully affect” “the trajectory of debt as a share of the economy.”
It’s own revised calculations show net general government debt hitting 85% of gross domestic product in 2021 instead of 93%. That’s a big difference.
The 85% figure is still uncomfortably high and may well not deserve a AAA rating. But S&P was too dismissive in its clarification.
3. The error is understandable but remarkably sloppy for such an important analysis.
The source of the error is painfully familiar to anyone who deals with U.S. budget projections. S&P’s analysts didn’t use the right measuring stick — i.e., the right budget baseline — when analyzing the effects of the recently-enacted Budget Control Act.
In one sense, it’s easy to see how this error happened. Budget discussions are now hopelessly confused by a profusion of different baseline projections of what spending and revenues will look like in the future. Indeed, I have devoted multiple posts to clarifying how different revenue baselines fit together (e.g., here and here). I’ve even used Johnny Depp to highlight the challenge.
A similar challenge exists with discretionary spending. Official budget baselines assume that annual appropriations (the defense and non-defense spending Congress fights over every year) grow with inflation unless subject to an explicit cap. That was the basis, for example, for the official baseline that the Congressional Budget Office used in evaluating the impacts of the Budget Control Act.
Before the BCA, there were no discretionary spending caps, so annual budget authority was assumed to grow with inflation from the most recent appropriated levels. The BCA then generated $917 billion in budget savings by setting annual spending caps below those levels.
S&P messed up because it based its analysis on another baseline. That “alternative fiscal scenario” assumes that discretionary spending grows at the same pace as the overall economy, not just with inflation. That baseline implies much more spending and debt over the next decade — $2 trillion more, in fact — than the official baseline.
So, again, it’s easy to see mechanically how this error happened. But it’s still remarkably sloppy. Budget experts are well-aware of the problem of multiple baselines. Indeed, we all pepper our conversations and analysis with the question “what baseline are you using?” It’s stunning that S&P didn’t have multiple analysts asking the same question to make sure their original numbers were right.
4. S&P’s response to the error further demonstrates that its primary concern about the United States is political not numerical.
As S&P said in Friday’s report:
Our opinion is that elected officials remain wary of tackling the structural issues required to effectively address the rising U.S. public debt burden in a manner consistent with a ‘AAA’ rating and with ‘AAA’ rated sovereign peers. In our view, the difficulty in framing a consensus on fiscal policy weakens the government’s ability to manage public finances and diverts attention from the debate over how to achieve more balanced and dynamic economic growth in an era of fiscal stringency and private-sector deleveraging.
In short, S&P worries that America won’t get its act together in time.
Five Things You Should Know About the S&P Downgrade
August 6th, 2011On Friday night, Standard and Poors announced that it was downgrading U.S. long-term sovereign debt from AAA to AA+, the first such downgrade in U.S. history.
Here are five things you should know about the downgrade — four important, one trivia.
1. S&P downgraded U.S. debt not only because of the deteriorating fiscal outlook, but also because of concerns about America’s ability to govern itself. It said:
The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America’s governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal policy. Despite this year’s wide-ranging debate, in our view, the differences between political parties have proven to be extraordinarily difficult to bridge, and, as we see it, the resulting agreement fell well short of the comprehensive fiscal consolidation program that some proponents had envisaged until quite recently. Republicans and Democrats have only been able to agree to relatively modest savings on discretionary spending while delegating to the Select Committee decisions on more comprehensive measures. It appears that for now, new revenues have dropped down on the menu of policy options. In addition, the plan envisions only minor policy changes on Medicare and little change in other entitlements, the containment of which we and most other independent observers regard as key to long-term fiscal sustainability.
2. Moody’s and Fitch recently reaffirmed their AAA ratings on U.S. sovereign debt. On Tuesday, Moody’s reaffirmed its Aaa rating, but assigned a negative outlook given the risk that the U.S. might flinch from further fiscal tightening, borrowing costs might rise, and the economy might weaken. Fitch similarly reiterated its AAA rating on Tuesday, but noted that it would have a fuller reassessment by the end of August. Fitch also emphasized the need for further fiscal adjustments.
One issue (on which I haven’t seen much discussion) is how the impact of a downgrade would increase if it spreads from just one rating agency to two or three.
3. In the past thirty years, five nations — Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden– have regained a AAA rating after losing it. See, for example, this nice chart from BusinessWeek:
America still has much to learn from other nations that fixed their economies and budgets after financial crises. Sweden, for example, did a remarkable job addressing the fiscal challenges that followed its financial crisis in the early 1990s.
4. This downgrade may set off a cascade of further downgrades for other U.S. debt. The federal government provides an implicit or explicit backstop for many other debt securities. For example, the federal government stands behind trillions of dollars of debt and guarantees issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, GNMA securities, and securities backed by guaranteed student loans. It implicitly stands behind systemically important financial institutions. And it provides substantial support to state and local governments. S&P did not specifically address these other credits in Friday’s report, but did say that:
On Monday, we will issue separate releases concerning affected ratings in the funds, government-related entities, financial institutions, insurance, public finance, and structured finance sectors.
S&P did reaffirm its highest, A-1+ rating on U.S. short-term debt, which should limit impacts on money market funds and other short-term lending markets.
5. S&P was not the first rating agency to downgrade U.S. sovereign debt. In the category of trivia, China’s Dagong credit rating agency downgraded U.S. credit to A with a negative outlook earlier this week. Dagong had initiated U.S. coverage with a AA rating about a year ago, which was lowered to A+ last November. Dagong apparently views the United States as a greater risk than China. Despite all of America’s problems, that seems a stretch.
In addition, Egan-Jones, a U.S. rating agency, cut the U.S. to AA+ in mid-July. Egan-Jones thus wins the prize as first U.S.-based agency to downgrade. Writing in the Financial Times, Michael Mackenzie noted:
Egan-Jones was officially recognised in 2008 by the Securities and Exchange Commission and, unlike its larger rivals, generates revenue from institutional investors and not from issuers of debt. During the past decade it downgraded US carmakers and structured credit products before similar decisions by the big rating agencies.
(ht: Dan Diamond for pointing out the Egan-Jones downgrade.)
Does the Gang of Six Cut Taxes or Raise Them?
July 20th, 2011Here’s a quick multiple choice quiz about the Gang of Six’s new budget proposal.
Over the next ten years, would the proposal:
a. Cut taxes by $1.5 trillion
b. Increase taxes by $2.0 trillion
c. Increase taxes by $1.2 trillion
d. All of the above.
If you answered (d), you have a fine future as a budget watcher (or you peeked at the answer from the last time we played this game).
The answer depends on the yard stick you use to measure changes in tax revenues. Unfortunately, people now use at least three different yard sticks.
The first, known as the current law baseline, assumes that Congress doesn’t change the tax laws on the books today. That means every temporary tax cut expires in the next two years, including the individual tax cuts enacted in 2001/2003 and extended in 2010, the “patch” that limits the growth of the alternative minimum tax, and the current estate tax.
The second, known as the current policy baseline, assumes those three temporary tax cuts all get permanently extended.
The third, known variously as the Fiscal Commission’s plausible baseline or the alternative fiscal scenario of 2010, assumes that those three temporary tax cuts all get extended with one big exception: the tax cuts that benefit “high-income” taxpayers expire.
With three different yard sticks, we get three different measures of the impact of the Go6 proposal.
Relative to the current law baseline, the Go6 plan would be a $1.5 trillion tax cut. In other words, the Go6 plan would raise $1.5 trillion less in revenue over the next ten years than if Congress did nothing, and all the temporary tax cuts expired. That’s an important number because the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Congressional Budget Office are required to use current law in preparing official budget scores.
Relative to the Fiscal Commission’s baseline, the Go6 plan is a $1.2 trillion tax increase. That includes three pieces: $1.0 trillion from reducing tax preferences (some of which may be the moral equivalent of cutting spending), $133 billion in new revenues for the highway trust fund (but not from higher gas taxes), and about $60 billion from using a lower measure of inflation – the chain CPI – to index the tax code.
Relative to current policy, finally, the Go6 plan is roughly a $2 trillion tax increase. In addition to the $1.2 trillion in tax increases noted above, it assumes an additional $800 billion in revenue – equivalent to what would be raised by allowing the “high-income” tax cuts to expire.* The Go6 plan would thus raise about $2 trillion more in revenue over the next ten years than if Congress simply kept in place the tax policies that apply in 2011 (except the payroll tax holiday, which everyone assumes will eventually expire).
Bottom line: You should expect to hear the plan characterized as anything from a $1.5 trillion tax cut to a $2 trillion tax hike.
P.S. For a similar discussion comparing two of the three baselines, see this nice piece by David Wessel of the Wall Street Journal.
P.P.S. What really matters, of course, is the plan itself, not how it scores against some possibly arbitrary baselines. Bob Williams makes that point here.
* I revised this sentence to emphasize that the plan includes revenue equivalent to letting the “high-income” tax cuts expire; it doesn’t actually let the rates expire – instead, it includes a wholesale reform that includes lowering the top rate to no more than 29 percent.


