Is the GOP Tax Reform Strategy a Fiscal Trap?
I recently blogged on Doug Holtz-Eakin’s four-step framework for tax reform. His roadmap—first agree on a progressive tax code, a top rate, and the total amount of revenue to be raised, then cut the tax preferences necessary to accomplish the first three—has generated lots of interest.
But Chuck Marr over at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities is no fan.
In his own blog, Chuck argues that the Holtz-Eakin model is a fiscal trap that would increase both deficits and income inequality. Thus, he presents his own alternative four-step plan:
1. Let the Bush tax cuts aimed at households making over $250,000 expire on schedule.
2. Agree on how much additional revenue to raise, alongside significant spending cuts, as part of a balanced deficit-reduction package.
3. Agree on specific revenue-raisers while maintaining or improving tax progressivity.
4. Reduce tax rates below their scheduled current law levels only if Congress can cut enough tax preferences to meet the revenue target without gimmicks.
The differences between the two models are subtle but very important. Let’s look at a couple:
Doug, a former director of the Congressional Budget Office and top economic policy adviser to President George W. Bush and the 2008 McCain for President campaign, wants to fix revenues as a share of Gross Domestic Product. Thus, Congress would agree that the new revenue code would raise X percent of GDP in taxes without regard to what revenues would otherwise be under some baseline.
By contrast, Chuck wants Congress to agree on how much additional revenue to raise relative to current law.
Mathematically, you can end up in the same place, but journeys are very different. Chuck would continue the argument we’ve been having since 2001, and it is a debate that has gotten us absolutely nowhere. First there is the hopelessly unproductive squabble over baselines—additional revenue relative to what? That could be resolved if later this year President Obama convinces Congress to permanently extend most of the 2001/2003/2010 tax cuts. But that’s a massive if.
Chuck’s strategy forces Republicans to swallow an in-your-face tax hike—something they are simply not going to do. They are no more likely to accept this than Democrats would agree to a Social Security reform that is presented as a cut in benefits. Framing matters.
The second big difference is the order in which they’d move toward reform. Doug would first fix a revenue target and the top rate, then scale back tax preferences to meet those twin targets. Chuck would first broaden the tax base. Congress would cut rates only after it agrees to the tax hikes it needs to meet its revenue increase target.
Chuck’s fear is that Congress would blink when confronted with painful base-broadening and that the revenue target, not the lower rates, would inevitably give way.
Joe Minarik, a veteran of the 1986 tax reform process who is now at the Committee for Economic Development, is generally supportive of Doug’s formulation, but in his own blog he agrees with Chuck that it makes more sense to get the tax base right and then fix the rates.
As a matter of pure tax policy, I agree with Chuck and Joe. Ideally, Congress should build the best possible tax base and then adjust the rates to meet an agreed-upon revenue target. But I think they misread the psychology of today’s policymakers.
Look at recent history. For decades, policy wonks have urged Congress to eliminate popular tax breaks to help meet a goal of deficit reduction. Lawmakers have responded by repeatedly adding tax subsidies and increasing the deficit.
This is not working. Perhaps lawmakers would do a better job of dumping tax preferences if their goal mixed the sweet of rate cuts with the bitter of deficit reduction.
Sure, Chuck may be right that all this is a Republican Trojan Horse—a clever strategy to lower rates and increase deficits and inequality. Mitt Romney’s tax reform (at least that part he is willing to describe) would do just that and is not, as they say, a confidence-builder.
Still, Doug’s roadmap has the benefit of reframing what has so far been an entirely non-productive debate. Will it work? As I said in my original post, probably not. But it has a chance. Merely repeating the arguments of the past decades does not.
Chuck’s fear is that Congress would blink when confronted with painful base-broadening and that the revenue target, not the lower rates, would inevitably give way.
That’s why Bush 41 and Clinton were unsuccessful in raising tax rates to increase revenue after the 1986 base broadening, right?
Oh, wait… Bush 41 and Clinton raised rates? Maybe Chuck needs to read his recent tax history!
Tax Reform is a trap, but it’s a familiar one. Broaden the base in exchange for lower rates. Wait several years. Increase the rates without restoring the former tax breaks. Exchange new tax breaks for campaign contributions. Increase rates some more. Sell more breaks. When the public gets fed up, propose Tax Reform. Rinse and repeat.
Tax Reform sounds good in theory and it makes its supporters feel great, but everybody knows how it works out in practice. It’s politically unstable, like a $100 bill lying on the floor in the center aisle of Congress.
Proponents of higher revenue studiously ignore the sorry history of evanescent Tax Reform. They feign ignorance because they hope to take us down this well-worn road, kicking the entitlement can all the way. I won’t be taken for that ride.
I like the Center for Fiscal Equity plan better – assign various taxes to various spending items in such a way as to get the wealthy to see what is true below the surface – that when debt reduction actually takes place (both in response to a stronger Euro and a consolidated Eurodebt and the retirement of the Baby Boomers), it will be their children who will bear the burden, not the entire next generation. I also have more faith than Howard does that wealthy donors will realize that doing nothing increases their taxes much more than anything Obama would do under a Simpson-Bowles framework – and they will realize this soon – perhaps as soon as George Allen loses his Senate primary to unknown Tea Party favorite Jamie Ratke. Once primary season is over, a deal is in the offing.
You keep missing the point that nothing can be agreed on taxes or rates unless there is a cap or limit on spending. Those of us who are paying the freight do not trust Congress on spending — there always is a new program, war, or agency to overfund. Please do not raise my rates or effectively raise them (by eliminating say the interest deduction) until you stop the red ink. Once you solve the outflow, I’m open to increasing the inflow of taxes. And please stop the nonsense that only those making over $250K need have taxes upped. We all need to contribute to the solution and country.
There are spending caps in existence in the Budget Control Act. You can’t cap entitlements.
You can’t cap entitlements.…under current law.
FTFY. That’s why legislation is needed!
Until entitlements are effectively capped, tax increases are worse than pointless: they enable further can-kicking.
I learned a new abbreviation today.
Before someone is tempted to write FTFY, make that *acronym*.