CBO Updates its Report on the Looming Debt Crisis
Every couple years, the Congressional Budget Office publishes a very scary document, The Long-Term Budget Outlook. As in previous reports, the conclusion is that a continuation of current policies would lead to an unsustainable increase in the national debt.
Here’s how you read the report. CBO simulates two scenarios. One is called “extended baseline,” in which all of the Bush tax cuts expire on schedule after 2012, the AMT engulfs the middle class in a web of higher taxes and mind-numbing complexity, and payments to providers under Medicare are slashed. While all of these things are technically scheduled to occur under current law, none is likely. Congress recently extended the Bush tax cuts, the AMT “patch” (which protects most middle class people from the dread tax), and the Medicare “doc fix,” and is likely to do so again.
The “alternative fiscal scenario” assumes that federal tax revenues return to their historical levels (18.4% of GDP) and health care spending continues to grow at roughly its historical rate (2 percentage points faster than GDP). The alternative scenario should really be labeled “current policy,” and it’s pretty bleak, as shown in the chart above (from the cover of the CBO report). Within 10 years, debt will exceed 100% of GDP. By 2037, it would be more than double the size of the economy.
That scenario, as dreadful as it is, is wildly over-optimistic, because it doesn’t account for the effect of rising debt levels on interest rates and the economy. In recent years, CBO has gotten more forceful in explaining this point. I’ll quote from the summary:
CBO’s projections in most of this report understate the severity of the long-term budget problem because they do not incorporate the negative effects that additional federal debt would have on the economy, nor do they include the impact of higher tax rates on people’s incentives to work and save. In particular, large budget deficits and growing debt would reduce national saving, leading to higher interest rates, more borrowing from abroad, and less domestic investment—which in turn would lower income growth in the United States. Taking those effects into account, CBO estimates that under the extended-baseline scenario, real (inflation-adjusted) gross national product (GNP) would be reduced slightly by 2025 and by as much as 2 percent by 2035, compared with what it would be under the stable economic environment that underlies most of the projections in this report. Under the alternative fiscal scenario, real GNP would be 2 percent to 6 percent lower in 2025, and 7 percent to 18 percent lower in 2035, than under a stable economic environment.
Rising levels of debt also would have other negative consequences that are not incorporated in those estimated effects on output:
- Higher levels of debt imply higher interest payments on that debt, which would eventually require either higher taxes or a reduction in government benefits and services.
- Rising debt would increasingly restrict policymakers’ ability to use tax and spending policies to respond to unexpected challenges, such as economic downturns or financial crises. As a result, the effects of such developments on the economy and people’s well-being could be worse.
- Growing debt also would increase the probability of a sudden fiscal crisis, during which investors would lose confidence in the government’s ability to manage its budget and the government would thereby lose its ability to borrow at affordable rates. Such a crisis would confront policymakers with extremely difficult choices. To restore investors’ confidence, policymakers would probably need to enact spending cuts or tax increases more drastic and painful than those that would have been necessary had the adjustments come sooner.
If you’d like to see a graphic description of the “sudden fiscal crisis” scenario, see my article, ”Countdown to Catastrophe.” It’s terrifying.
Back to CBO, the obvious conclusion (at least if you’re not a lawmaker):
To keep deficits and debt from climbing to unsustainable levels, policymakers will need to increase revenues substantially as a percentage of GDP, decrease spending significantly from projected levels, or adopt some combination of those two approaches. Making such changes while economic activity and employment remain well below their potential levels would probably slow the economic recovery. However, the sooner that medium- and long-term changes to tax and spending policies are agreed on, and the sooner they are carried out once the economy recovers, the smaller will be the damage to the economy from growing federal debt. Earlier action would permit smaller or more gradual changes and would give people more time to adjust to them, but it would require more sacrifices sooner from current older workers and retirees for the benefit of younger workers and future generations.
Translation: big tax increases or spending cuts right now would be a bad idea given the fragile state of the economy, but committing to serious debt reduction that will take effect once the economy has recovered is urgent if we are to avoid a budget catastrophe.
For fun, I looked at the first edition of the long-term budget outlook from 2000. It may surprise some readers that we were worried about long-term fiscal trends more than a decade ago, but independent budget analysts and the CBO recognized that rising health care costs and the aging of the baby boomers would put enormous pressure on the federal government. Of course, the fiscal situation seemed much brighter back in 2000. The economy was running surpluses and CBO was projecting them continuing for many years. So CBO’s discussion was about what we should do with the surpluses:
The aging of the large baby-boom generation and growth in the cost of health care will dramatically increase spending for federal health and retirement programs under current law. If policymakers act to ensure that the budget remains in surplus over the near term, the resulting drop in debt held by the public and the lower interest costs that follow will help offset some portion of that increase. Preserving the full amount of the projected surpluses could substantially delay the onset of fiscal problems and help boost GDP, providing a larger base of resources from which to meet the increased demand for spending. But even if policymakers preserved all projected surpluses, spending and revenues would be unlikely to balance over the next 75 years.
When the stock market bubble burst in 2000, the projected surpluses vanished too so there was no surplus to save. CBO’s 2000 analysis would seem to suggest that reducing deficits would be a matter of some urgency even then, but instead we enacted a series of large tax cuts and increased spending on national security, Medicare, and, later, economic stimulus.
Which explains why the current report has a much stronger sense of urgency.
This was originally posted on my blog, The Impertinent Economist.
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“CBO’s projections in most of this report understate the severity of the long-term budget problem because they do not incorporate the negative effects that additional federal debt would have on the economy, nor do they include the impact of higher tax rates on people’s incentives to work and save.”
The CBO has resisted, rightly I think, efforts to require them to incorporate macro economic analysis into their scoring. However, the CBO (and others) have suggested that such analysis can be useful “on the side”.
This issue is a key factor in causing the problem we’re currently in. I don’t think the problem is the lack of “dynamic scoring” per se. The problem is demonstrated in the following:
“Taking those effects into account, CBO estimates that under the extended-baseline scenario, real (inflation-adjusted) gross national product (GNP) would be reduced slightly by 2025 and by as much as 2 percent by 2035, compared with what it would be under the stable economic environment that underlies most of the projections in this report. Under the alternative fiscal scenario, real GNP would be 2 percent to 6 percent lower in 2025, and 7 percent to 18 percent lower in 2035, than under a stable economic environment.”
Here, contrary to the standard budgeting approach of using only a 10-year budget window, the CBO is reflecting the real costs of our budget deficits over long-term period (albeit without the same degree of false certainty). Even a dynamic scoring approach to this issue would typically fail to incorporate the long-term costs of deficits because the benefits of those tax cuts and and spending increases are deemed to fall within the 10-year window, while much of the costs beyond it. Even costs that due fall within the budget window are ignored, such as the increased costs associated with servicing the debt.
Today, we are paying not just for those budget mistakes made last year or 10 years ago. We are now paying for budget mistakes (both taxing and spending) that go back many more years.
While I am not an accountant, I increasingly am acquiring a much greater respect for the work that they do and the approach they generally take when measuring financial condition. Their work and the approach they take comes much closer to reflecting reality than the work of economists (which most often is designed, for political reasons, to obfuscate it). In accounting for such future liabilities of a private corporation, with few exceptions, an accountant would be required to put a liability on the balance sheet (either current or deferred). The government does not do that. I think this is largely due to the fact that our approach to government finance and budgeting has been, in recent decades, increasingly taken over by economists rather than accountants and the extent of our budget problems more or less tracks this development.
We need more government accounting and less macro economics and we need more econometrics and less normative economics.
In projecting that the Bush tax cuts will be extended you must assume that the President still has Larry Summers on speed dial. With him out of the equation, you cannot assume that any extension to the Bush cuts won’t be matched by a spending cut. The onus is on the GOP to compromise, mostly because if they don’t, all the tax cuts expire. If you assume that taxes being too low is the problem, rather than a solution, Obama should not compromise and if his inner circle buys that argument, the GOP must dance to his tune. It may very well be that it was not the high spending that got us out of the Great Depression, but instead the high taxes. Taxing away the gains of speculation may well lead capital to capitulate on mortgage modification, which will allow everyone to have the gains capital is realizing now.
Health care costs can only go up so much. It cannot expand ad infinitum. There is a ceiling at some point, either because people stop demanding so much health care, cost controls are put in on drugs (or patent protections are removed), or because people will find something else to spend on.
It is actually a good thing that we can afford to spend more on health. Food is cheap, manufactured goods are cheap, homes are cheap (probably too cheap). The alternative is for all these costs to go up, which will reduce the relative share of health care costs in the economy.
I actually ascribe to a more Keynsian view of taxes, may be neo-Keynesian is a better term. The reason the economy is continuing at its anemic pace is that taxes are actually too low among those who own capital. That is why it can just sit there and make companies rich. CEOs are doing quite well in their rigged games. Tax some of that cash away and business owners will need to expand to keep the same level of income (at least at the high end). Why have real productivity when the tax systm reward rent seeking at inordinate levels? There simply is no reason to. Tax away some of that economic rent, and the way to expand income is to expand production. Tax economic rent enough and rentiers will stop seeking it – both in real property and in labor markets that are monopsonistically competitive.
Rewarding speculation with low capital gains taxes means more money in more speculative investments – like Facebook.